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Introduction
Uniform comprehensive income taxation is a popular policy option. 1 Advocates of this tax argue not only that it is fair, but also that it is neutral in terms of investment decisions. According to the well-known Johansson-Samuelson Theorem (JST), 2 if all kinds of capital are subject to the same marginal tax rate and …scal depreciation allowances coincide with economic depreciation, then investment strategies are una¤ected by taxation.
It is worth noting that the JST has been proven in a partial-equilibrium model. In this article we therefore aim to analyze the JST in general equilibrium. To do so we refer to two streams of literature. The …rst one deals with the JST and provides some generalizations of its basic results in partial equilibrium. In particular, Fane (1987) and Richter (1988) prove that this theorem holds even if the investment return and the resale value of capital are stochastic. Moreover, Niemann (1999) shows that the JST holds in a real-option setting. 3 In a subsequent article, Niemann (2004) also proves that neutrality is ensured even under tax rate uncertainty. 4 The second stream of literature deals with the e¤ects of taxation in general equilibrium. Starting from the pioneering article by Domar and Musgrave (1944) , 5 Kaplow (1994) has improved this topic by dealing with a government's ability to in ‡uence risk taking through portfolio investments as well as through tax policy. He has shown that in this context, many partial equilibrium results fail to hold. Quite recently, Abel (2007) has analyzed both consumption-based and comprehensive income taxation in a deterministic general equilibrium model. He has shown that, while consumption-based 1 Its popularity is, e.g., shown by the US Report of the President's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform (2005). 2 The JST is the joint result of Johansson's (1961, 1969 ) and Samuelson's (1964) …ndings. For a discussion of the JST see, e.g., Sinn (1987, ch. 5) and Lyon (1990) . 3 For a discussion on tax neutrality in a real-option setting see, e.g., Panteghini (2007) . 4 Another interesting result is that found by Hartwick et al. (2002) , who identify a depreciation rule that does not encourage extractive …rms to deviate from a laissez-faire strategy. 5 See also Bulow and Summers (1984) and Gordon (1985) , who have analyzed the e¤ects of taxation on risk taking. In particular, Bulow and Summers (1984) have pointed out that the asset price volatility can lead to a huge impact in terms of both revenue raising as well as to distortions. On the other hand, Gordon (1985) has proven that, under certain conditions, taxation has negligible impact on the equilibrium allocation and at the same time, allows the collection of a large amount of revenue. For further details on this topic see Devereux (2003). 1 taxation is a neutral and powerful revenue-raiser, comprehensive taxation has many shortcomings. In particular, he has shown that under a comprehensive income tax, it is possible to …nd a neutral …scal depreciation allowance (in line with that proposed by Hall and Jorgenson, 1971, and Boadway and Bruce, 1984) , although de facto this rule leads to the collection of no revenue. 6 In this article, we will merge these two streams of literature, and study the JST in general equilibrium. We will show that the JST is violated, in that its depreciation rule does not ensure tax invariance of both a …rm's value and market prices, unless quite restrictive conditions are met. Moreover, we will also see that the neutral depreciation rule in general equilibrium su¤ers from implementation problems.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 introduces income and interest rate risk and discusses the JST in partial equilibrium. Section 3 introduces a stochastic general equilibrium model and compares our …ndings with those obtained in partial equilibrium. Section 4 summarizes our results and discusses their policy implications.
The JST in a stochastic context
In order to understand the JST in a general equilibrium setting, we …rst need to see under which conditions the JST holds in partial equilibrium. Let us therefore focus on a representative …rm, that faces both income and interest rate risk. Accordingly, let us introduce the following: Assumption 1 From time t 0 to time T , a representative …rm receives a cash ‡ow (t) that evolves according to the following stochastic process:
where (t; ) is the instantaneous expected growth, (t; ) 2 R k is the instantaneous standard deviation of growth, dW Q (t) is a vector of independent Wiener processes, under the risk-neutral probability measure Q, and the prime denotes transposition.
Assumption 2
The spot interest rate evolves as follows:
where r (t; r) is the instantaneous expected growth, and r (t; ) 2 R k is the instantaneous standard deviation of growth.
Assumptions 1 and 2 allow us to deal with both non-systematic and systematic risk. The former is related to the …rm-speci…c stochastic process (1) and is embedded in the di¤usion term (t; ). The latter is due to the volatility of the …nancial system, and is therefore embedded in the di¤usion term r (t; r) of process (2) . The instantaneous correlation between (t) and r(t) is given by 0 (t; ) r (t; r) dt:
When cash ‡ow and interest rate are not correlated, cash ‡ow risk cannot be completely diversi…ed and therefore, process (1) also a¤ects systematic risk. We have no a priori on the sign of correlation. 7 For simplicity, hereafter we will omit all the functional dependences for drift and di¤usion terms.
Let us next denote (s) and as the …scal depreciation allowance at time s and the uniform tax rate levied on a …rm's income, respectively. Under the assumption that the relevant tax system is fully symmetric, a …rm's after-tax cash ‡ow at time s is thus equal to [(1 ) (s) + (s)]. Therefore, a …rm's expected present value at any time t 2 [t 0 ; T ] is equal to
where E Q t [:] is the expectation operator, conditional on the information available at time t, and under the risk neutral probability measure Q. 8 7 The correlation between cash ‡ow and the interest rate is taken into account by Berk et al. (1999) . In their numerical simulations they assume a negative covariance between a …rm's cash ‡ow and the spot interest rate. Their hypothesis …ts well with the characteristics of manufacturing …rms. Indeed, as long as a manufacturing …rm is debt-…nanced, an increase in the interest rate is expected to reduce cash ‡ow and vice versa. On the other hand, banks are a remarkable example of positive correlation. In this case, an increase in the interest rate is expected to raise both their spread margin and cash ‡ow. 8 In an arbitrage-free market, the value of any traded asset is given by the expected present value of its future cash ‡ows discounted with the risk-free interest rate, under the risk-neutral probability. For further details on the risk-neutral probability see, e.g., Björk (1998) .
A …rm's value V (t) can also be found as the solution of a partial differential equation. Applying the Feynman-Kaµ c theorem (see Björk, 1998, pp. 59-60) , the expected value V (t) is the solution of the following partial di¤erential equation:
where ; , r; , ; , and r; are the after-tax drift and di¤usion terms of cash ‡ow and interest rate, and where both the RHS and the LHS must be equal to 1 dt E Q t [dV (t)]. 9 Let us next introduce the zero-tax value function:
Again, applying the Feynman-Kaµ c theorem, and di¤erentiating (5) gives
where both the RHS and the LHS must be equal to 1 dt E Q t [dV (t)]. Using (4) and (6) we can …nd a depreciation rule that ensures the equality V (t) = V (t), 8t. Notice that the boundary conditions 9 We can rewrite (4) as a well-known non-arbitrage condition:
that entails the equality between the after-tax return on a default-free asset, on the LHS, and the …rm's expected return, on the RHS. Terms [(1 ) (t) + (t)] and hold. This means that, irrespective of taxation, a …rm's value is nil at time T . Let us next equate the RHSs of Equations (4) and (6) . We set V (t) = V (t) for t < T , and solve for (t) :
We therefore obtain the neutral depreciation rule
In other terms, we can say that neutrality holds if and only if the …scal depreciation allowance satis…es (8) .
It is worth noting that if the drift and di¤usion terms are una¤ected by taxation (i.e., = ; , r = r; , = ; , and r = r; ), then (8) reduces to the well-known JST depreciation rule:
The equalities = ; , r = r; , = ; , and r = r; are not only su¢ cient but also necessary conditions. In fact, the …ve last terms of the RHS of Equation (8), containing the derivatives of V (t) with respect to (t) and r (t), are nil for any value of (t) and r (t) only if = ; , r = r; , = ; , and r = r; . Therefore, we can conclude that:
The JST depreciation rule (9) guarantees tax neutrality if and only if the drift and di¤usion terms of state variables (r (t) and (t)) are una¤ected by taxation.
The condition of Lemma 1 implicitly holds in partial equilibrium setting. As we will show however, in general equilibrium, the drift and di¤usion terms of the state variables can be distorted by taxation. Therefore, the condition of Lemma 1 is not easily met.
A general equilibrium approach
In section 2 we have shown that the depreciation rule of the JST is valid if, according to Lemma 1, the stochastic processes driving the state variables (cash ‡ow and interest rate) are una¤ected by taxation. In this section we show that such a condition may fail to hold in a general equilibrium framework where: (i) cash ‡ows are the endowments of economic agents, and (ii) the interest rate is endogenously determined. In particular, we will …nd a depreciation rule that ensures tax invariance of market prices. However, this depreciation rule does not coincide with the JST depreciation rule (8), unless harsher conditions are met. 10 The representative consumer On the economy there is a representative consumer who fully owns the only …rm in the economy. Preferences on the intertemporal consumption c (t) are described by a strictly increasing and concave utility function, represented by e t U (c (t)), where is an exogenously given time preference rate. Moreover, we assume that the …rm distributes all the after-tax cash ‡ow to the consumer. Using the notation of section 2 we can therefore say that at any time t, the representative consumer receives the dividend [(1 ) (t) + (t)]. At time t 0 , the consumer maximizes the expected utility of his intertemporal consumption from time t 0 to time T , under an intertemporal budget constraint. Since the discounted value of all his future consumption must be equal to the present value of his wealth, R (t 0 ), the consumer's problem is as follows:
where m (t 0 ; t) is the kernel price (i.e., the stochastic discount factor), and B (t) is the market value of a risk-free asset.
Capital market We assume that there are n risky assets and one risk-free asset. In the absence of taxation, the …nancial market is therefore described by the following di¤erential equations:
where I S is a diagonal matrix containing the asset prices (as in vector S (t)), is the vector of the expected returns on risky assets, and is the volatility matrix.
In a general equilibrium framework, the values , , and r are endogenously determined. By Walras' law, however, we cannot determine these three prices ( , , and r) univocally. According to the standard approach (see, e.g., Cvitanić and Zapatero, 2004 , Part III), therefore we determine: (i) the risk-free interest rate r, and (ii) the market price of risk : Assuming the existence of the left inverse of matrix 0 , the market price of risk is therefore equal to 0 1 ( r1) ;
where 1 is a vector of 1 0 s. 11 Under the risk neutral probability measure (Q) the expected return of any traded asset on the …nancial market must equate the risk-free interest rate. This means that the equality
must hold. Moreover, notice that (14) must coincide with (11) . Therefore, equating the RHS of Equations (11) and (14) gives
The stochastic process (15) shows that , as de…ned in (13) , allows to switch from the historical to the risk neutral probability measure (and vice versa). 11 For further details see, e.g., Du¢ e and Zame (1989).
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In particular, it is possible to prove (see, e.g., Du¢ e, 1996, ch. 6) that the market price of risk and the kernel price m (t 0 ; t) are linked by the following di¤erential equation
m (t 0 ; t 0 ) = 1:
The public sector The government levies a tax rate on comprehensive income. The same tax rate is applied to:
1. risk-free asset return, and so the after-tax rate is r = (1 ) r;
2. risky asset returns, and so the after-tax returns are = (1 ) :
Given these results, we can write the after-tax market price of risk as follows:
The di¤usion matrix is una¤ected by taxation because the tax is not levied on the stock price but rather on the stock returns.
Let us next introduce the following:
Assumption 3 At any time, public spending is always equal to tax revenue, and has no direct impact on the private sector (i.e., on consumers and …rms).
According to Assumption 3, taxation can be interpreted as simply being a real drain on the economy (Aseaa and Turnovsky, 1998). 12 Assumption 3 has two main implications. Firstly, the public budget constraint is always in equilibrium and therefore, the government does not issue any public debt bond. Secondly, public spending has no direct impact on the private sector, i.e., it a¤ects neither the marginal utility of private consumption nor the …rm productivity.
Given these assumptions, the after-tax cash ‡ow, denoted as (t) (1 ) (t) + (t), evolves as follows:
Let us next …nd the depreciation rule that ensures neutrality in general equilibrium. A priori, we do not know whether this neutral depreciation allowance is deterministic or stochastic. 13 Therefore, let us introduce a general depreciation allowance that evolves as follows:
where and 0 are the unknown drift and volatility parameters, respectively. We will therefore …nd the values of and 0 that ensure neutrality. Substituting (18) into (17) gives
The equilibrium To complete the model we need a market-clearing condition, according to which distributed dividends are fully consumed, i.e.,
Given the above assumptions, we can write the following:
The equilibrium spot interest rate and market price of risk are equal to:
respectively, with
where U 0 ( ) ; U 00 ( ) and U 000 ( ) are the …rst, second and third derivative of U ( ) ; respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A In line with Du¢ e and Zame (1989), Proposition 1 shows that the spot interest rate is given by the subjective discount rate minus the expected rate of change in marginal utility (see the …rst line of Equation (21)). As can be seen in the second and third lines of (21), the spot interest rate r depends on consumer's preferences (i.e., and the utility function) as well as on a …rm's business activity (i.e., and ). In particular, r is given by three terms. The …rst term is equal to the intertemporal rate of substitution, divided by (1 ) . The second and third terms account for the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion measure A , and the third-order derivative of utility in K , respectively. We can see that risk (measured by ) matters only if the third derivative of the utility function (in K) does not equal zero. This is due to the fact that U 000 ((1 ) + ) allows us to measure the di¤erence between the expected and the actual marginal utility. 14 14 To understand how the third derivative of the utility function U (x) matters, let us assume a stochastic variable that evolves as follows:
If we expand the utility function U (x + dx) in Taylor series around dx = 0 we have:
Rearranging and taking expectations gives
As can be seen, the term U 000 (x) matters only in a stochastic context (i.e., with 2 x 6 = 0).
As shown in Eq. (22) , the equilibrium value of is given by the product between the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion measure and the term 0 + 1 0 , that measures a …rm's after-tax volatility. In other words, the equilibrium market price of risk is given by the product between cash ‡ow risk and risk aversion. Accordingly, the higher the risk aversion and/or the risk itself, the higher the market price of risk is.
Given Proposition 1, we can now calculate the values of and that ensure neutrality. We can thus prove the following:
The depreciation rule ensuring tax invariance in general equilibrium is such that:
where A and K are as in (23) and (24), respectively, with A A j =0 , and K K j =0 .
Proof. See Appendix B. Proposition 2 …nds the depreciation rule (i.e., the values of and ) that makes both the interest rate and the market price of risk tax invariant. As can be seen, this depreciation allowance is stochastic (i.e., 0 6 = 0): this means that the government must actively manage risk in order to achieve neutrality.
If we compare, on the one hand (21) and (22), and on the other hand, (25) and (26), we can see a parallel between the optimal depreciation rule ( , ) and the optimal prices (r, ). In particular, is proportional to the after-tax cash ‡ow volatility, and is proportional to the pre-tax cash ‡ow volatility. Moreover, r and are both proportional to the sum between the subjective discount rate ( ), the cash ‡ow drift , and the cash ‡ow variance 0 .
Let us next compare the JST rule of Equation (9) with the generalequilibrium one, given by (25)- (26) . We can prove that: = :
These conditions hold if and only if the utility function is such that
Proof. See Appendix C. Proposition 3 shows that the neutrality rule (25)-(26) di¤ers from the JST one, unless fairly restrictive conditions hold. As we can see, the rule determined by (25) and (26) Proof. See Appendix D.
According to Corollary 1, therefore, (28) and (29) are not met when we use the most common forms of the utility function. In fact, Constant Relative Risk Aversion, Constant Absolute Risk Aversion, log, and quadratic utility functions can all be obtained as special cases of the more general HARA function. To sum up, we can say that, according to Proposition 3 and Corollary 1, the JST rule cannot ensure neutrality in a realistic generalequilibrium setting.
On the other hand, we must say that the neutral depreciation rule of Proposition 2 is not a satisfactory solution, for two reasons. Firstly, the amount of tax revenue that can be raised from a …rm by the general equilibrium tax rule (25)-(26) is nil. The reasoning behind this result is straightforward: conditions (27) require that the depreciation allowance must have the same drift and di¤usion terms as the cash ‡ow. This implies that and must coincide. In other words, the government must rebate everything it raises with taxation ( ) to the …rm ( ) . Consequently, a …rm's e¤ective tax burden is null. 15 The second shortcoming of this neutrality rule is related to information requirements. As shown in Proposition 2, the neutral tax rule (25)-(26) crucially depends on volatility and is therefore risk-speci…c. This means that, if more than one …rm operates, a …rm-speci…c rule would be required to achieve neutrality, unless …rms were all identical. Since this neutral rule is informationally very demanding, a dramatic implementation issue arises.
Conclusion
In this article, we have shown that the celebrated Johansson-Samuelson Theorem may fail to hold in general equilibrium, unless harsh and unrealistic assumptions are set. Moreover, we have discussed an alternative rule that ensures neutrality in general equilibrium. However, this rule has two shortcomings. Firstly, it implies that the e¤ective tax burden on …rms is nil and secondly, it su¤ers from implementation problems, in that it requires a huge amount of information. We can therefore conclude that a neutral uniform-tax system is harder to implement than usually thought.
A Proof of Proposition 1
The Lagrangian function of Problem (10) is
The …rst order condition on (30) is
where U 0 ( ) is the …rst derivative of function U . Since this …rst order condition must hold for any state of the world, then we can set the integrand function equal to zero (for any time t). Since the utility function is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave, then the marginal utility is invertible and so we can rearrange (31) as follows:
Equation (20) implies that in equilibrium consumption must be equal to the after-tax dividend at any time. If we apply the marginal utility U 0 ( ) to both sides of the market-clearing Equation (20), we obtain
Applying Ito's Lemma to the RHS of (32), and using (12) and (16), we obtain
which can be written as
Taking the expected value of Equation (33) and solving for r, gives the …rst line of Equation (21) . Furthermore, let us apply Ito's lemma to U 0 ((1 ) (t) + (t)). Using Equation (19) we have:
where U 00 ( ) and U 000 ( ) are the second and the third derivative of the utility function, respectively. Notice that Equations (33) and (34) must be identical. Therefore, we can …nd the equilibrium prices by equating the drift and di¤usion components of (33) and (34). Rearranging we obtain the equilibrium values for both r and , i.e., r (t) = 1 U 00 ( (t)) U 0 ( (t))
U 000 ( (t)) U 0 ( (t))
;
Using (35) and (36) one easily obtains (21) and (22) . Proposition 1 is thus proven.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Let us calculate the values of and that ensure tax invariance of market prices. Firstly, in order for to be una¤ected by taxation, its value in (36) must be equal to the same value obtained with = 0, i.e., we must have U 00 ( (t)) U 0 ( (t))
U 00 ( (t)) U 0 ( (t)) 1 1 0 :
Using function (23) and setting A A j =0 , we can rewrite (37) as (26) . Let us next focus on the interest rate. In order for the equality r (t) = r (t) to hold, we must set the equilibrium value of the spot interest rate in (35) equal to that obtained with = 0: Therefore, we must have:
Rearranging and solving (38) with respect to gives 16 = U 0 ( (t)) U 00 ( (t)) (39)
U 00 ( (t)) U 0 ( (t)) 1 1
U 000 ( (t)) U 0 ( (t)) U 0 ( (t)) U 00 ( (t))
U 00 ( (t)) U 0 ( (t))
Using the function (24), setting K K j =0 , and rearranging (39) gives (25) . We have therefore obtained a tax policy ( ; ) that ensures the tax invariance of equilibrium market prices. Proposition 2 is thus proven.
C Proof of Proposition 3
As proven in Proposition 2, the depreciation rule (25)-(26) ensures the following equalities:
Since the risk-free interest rate r (t) is the same before and after taxation, then we have:
Since the after-tax cash ‡ow evolves according to
we can therefore write its drift and di¤usion terms as:
Substituting r; , r; , ; and ; into the JST depreciation rule (8) we obtain
Equation (40) In particular, (40) is equal to (9) for any value of (t) and r (t), if and only if the coe¢ cients of all the derivatives of V (t) are set equal to zero. These coe¢ cients are zero if and only if = and = . Let us …nally …nd conditions (28) and (29) . From Equation (26), we can see that = if and only if the utility function is such that condition
holds, where A is as in (23) and A A j =0 . Substituting this condition into Equation (25) we can see that = if and only if the utility function is such that
where K is as in (24) and K K j =0 . This concludes the proof of Proposition 3.
D Proof of Corollary 1
To prove Corollary 1, let us assume that a consumer's utility function is equal to
where > 0, c > , while and are parameters. Function (41) belongs to the so-called Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) family. It can be traced back to the usual utility functions studied in the relevant literature by using the following parameter combinations:
1. with = 0, = 1, we obtain a power utility function (Constant Relative Risk Aversion):
U (c) = c 1 1 1 ;
2. with = 1, and tending towards 0, we obtain an exponential utility function (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion):
U (c) = 1 e c ;
3. with = 0, = 1, and = 1, we obtain the log utility function:
U (c) = ln c;
4. with = we obtain the quadratic utility function:
Let us next calculate the …rst, second, and third derivatives of (41): which can be written as
Polynomial (42) is zero for any value of c if and only if all the coe¢ cients of c are zero, i.e.,
(1 ) 2 = 0; + (1 ) = 0:
As we can see, the only solution (with 6 = 0) is = 0; = 0:
However, the parameter can be zero only if = 1. This means that condition (28) does not hold for any utility function generally used in the literature.
